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Slippery soul

Here's the whole deal from the top:
      (I've already gone over some of the arguments but it doesn't hurt to go over them again. Especially knowing how error-prone I can be.)
      A (possibly novel) modal argument for the existence of a soul entity would be this. I can conceive of a possible world (W*) exactly like the actual world (W), except that I am not in that world.
      By hypothesis, GK* in W* has all the same physical and mental properties as GK in W.
      However, GK* is not I.
      Consider the metaphysical hypothesis that the difference between GK in W and GK* in W* is that they have different souls. If the souls of GK and GK* are different then something is different between W* and W. However, it is the one and only difference. The absolute, impregnable identity of souls is the only thing that distinguishes W* from W.
      Apart from supplying a 'magical' (as I called it) principle of individuation, can we say anything else about the soul?

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